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Abstract
In many arranged marriage contexts, a mediator assists the bride and the groom’s families in
determining the actual amount of the dowry. Although social scientists in general and
economists in particular have studied many aspects of dowries, to the best of our knowledge,
the nature of the interaction between a mediator and the two concerned parties has not been
analyzed previously in the literature. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to analyze a
simple game model of dowry determination. Specifically, we first solve for the Nash
equilibrium pair of final dowry offers from the two concerned parties. Next, we show how
the equilibrium dowry offers optimally trade off the desire to make an assertive offer with the
likelihood that this offer will be selected by the mediator.
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The reader should note that even though our discussion of dowry is in the context of arranged marriages in Hindu society in a
country like India, the phenomenon of dowry is also prevalent in the context of arranged marriages in other religions and in other
nations. For good general accounts of the phenomenon of dowry, the reader should consult Bumiller (1990), Menski (1998), and
Sheel (1999). For more on decision making in arranged marriages, see Batabyal (1998, 2004) and Batabyal and Beladi (2003).
2
For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Sharma (1993), Rao (1993), Agnihotri (2003), and Dalmia (2004).
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1. Introduction
The word “dowry” refers to a practice in Hindu society in which payments in cash and/or kind
are made by the family of the bride to the family of the groom at the time of marriage. Because most
marriages in Hindu society in a country like India are arranged, the practice of dowry has a
fundamental connection with the custom of arranging marriages for one’s children.
1 Sheel (1999) has
noted that the origins of the phenomenon of dowry can be traced back to Vedic times in which
expensive clothes, jewelry, and other items were frequently given voluntarily to both the bride and
to the groom’s families during the so called kanyadan or “giving the daughter away” ceremony. As
such, the original purpose of dowry was to sanctify material wealth and also to augment one’s status
at the time of marriage. 
In contemporary times however, the practice of dowry has changed substantially. In a
disproportionate number of arranged marriages in India and elsewhere, dowry payments are anything
but voluntary. In addition, Leslie (1998) and other have pointed out that such payments are now often
used by the groom’s family to impoverish the bride’s family by extracting large amounts of cash
and/or material resources as a precondition for marriage. The groom’s family is able to do this
because women tend to occupy an inferior position in India’s patrilineal kinship and family system.
The actual amount of the dowry that is demanded in any particular instance is closely related
to the economic and to the social status of the groom’s family. In this regard, Sheel (1999, p. 18) tells
us that the higher the socioeconomic status of the groom’s family, the higher is generally the demand
for dowry. This state of affairs naturally gives rise to two questions: First, how do the concerned
parties come to an agreement over the actual amount of the dowry payment? Second, if a mediator
is used, what is the nature of the interaction between this mediator and the bride and the groom’s
families? 
Extant research by social scientists in general and economists in particular provides a clear
answer to the first question and this answer is twofold.
2 We learn that in some arranged marriage
settings, the bride and the groom’s families directly negotiate with each other to determine the
amount of the dowry. However, Jaggi (2001) and Reddy (2002) have clearly noted that in many other
arranged marriage settings, the two concerned parties conduct the negotiations with the help of a
mediator. This leads us to the second question of the previous paragraph. Although there now exists
a large literature in the social sciences on dowries and economists themselves have contributed to3
For more on research by economists on alternate aspects of dowries, see Rao (1993), Bloch and Rao (2002), Anderson (2003),
Dalmia (2004), and Dalmia and Lawrence (2005).
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For more on static games of complete information, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, chapter 1) or Gibbons (1992, chapter 1).
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increasing our understanding of alternate aspects of dowries,
3 to the best of our knowledge, there is
no research—either by economists or by other social scientists—on the nature of the interaction
between a mediator and the bride and the groom’s families. 
Given this state of affairs, the purpose of this paper is to construct and analyze a simple game-
theoretic model of dowry determination in which the interests of the two concerned parties and those
of the mediator are explicitly accounted for. Specifically, in section 2.1, we describe our game
theoretic model of the dowry determination problem. Section 2.2 sets up and then solves the bride
and the groom’s optimization problems. Section 2.3 uses an example to illustrate the working of our
model. Section 3 concludes and offers suggestions for future research on the subject of this paper.
2. The Game Theoretic Model 
2.1. Preliminaries
It should be clear to the reader that in general, there are a variety of ways in which a mediator
can interact with the bride’s family and the groom’s family to determine the amount of the dowry
payment. Therefore, rather than model all the different kinds of mediation, for concreteness, in the
rest of this paper we shall think of the mediator as an arbitrator. Our game model of dowry
determination is based on Farber (1980) and the game itself is a static game of complete information.
4
There are three players. First, there is a representative from the bride’s family who we shall refer to
as the bride   Second, there is a representative from the groom’s family who we shall refer to as the b.
groom   Finally, there is a mediator who we shall designate with the letter  g. m.
The timing of the game between the bride, the groom, and the mediator is as follows. First,
the bride and the groom simultaneously make dowry offers   and   respectively. Second, the db dg
mediator selects one of the above two offers as the final dowry amount that is agreed upon by both
the bride and the groom. Because the mediator generally has some knowledge of both the bride and
the groom, we suppose that this individual has a preferred dowry amount in mind. Let us denote this
preferred amount by   Further, to keep the mathematics from getting unduly complicated, we dm.
suppose that after observing the offers   and   the mediator simply picks the offer that is closer db dg,
to his preferred amount    dm.
Clearly, from everything we know about actual dowries, we expect the offer made by the
bride to be less than that made by the groom. Mathematically, we expect   in equilibrium and dg>db
in our subsequent analysis we shall show that this is indeed the case. Given that the above inequality
holds in equilibrium, the mediator’s choice problem can be described as follows. He chooses   if db
 and he chooses   if  dm<(db%dg)/2 dg dm>(db%dg)/2.3
The mediator obviously knows   but neither the bride nor the groom know the mediator’s dm
preferred dowry amount. In other words, from the standpoint of the bride and the groom,   is a dm
random variable. As such, we suppose that the bride and the groom both believe that the cumulative
distribution function of   is   and that its density function is   With this stochastic dm H(dm) h(dm).
specification and given our delineation of the mediator’s choice problem in the previous paragraph,
we can deduce that












Now, combining equations (1) and (2) we can tell that the mediator’s expected dowry amount








In general, the bride will want the dowry to be as low as possible and, in contrast, the groom will
want the dowry to be as high as possible. Therefore, we suppose that the bride wants to minimize the
mediator’s expected dowry amount (given by equation (3)) and that the groom wants to maximize
this same amount.
2.2. The optimization problems
















Now, using the result that   the first order necessary conditions for an optimum for the H )(@)'h(@),




















































Inspecting equations (6) and (7) we see that the RHSs of these two equations are equal.











In words, equation (8) tells us that in equilibrium, the mean of the two dowry offers from the bride
and the groom must equal the median of the mediator’s preferred dowry amount. Now substituting














Equation (9) tells us that the gap between the two dowry offers made by the groom and the bride (the
RHS) must equal the reciprocal of the value of the density function at the median of the mediator’s
preferred dowry amount (the LHS). Now, in order to proceed further with the analysis, it will be
helpful to make an assumption about the distribution of our mediator’s preferred dowry amount dm.
Therefore, we suppose that   is normally distributed with mean   and variance   This dm µ σ2.





It is well known that the normal distribution is symmetric about its mean and hence the mean µ
equals the median for this distribution. In our case, this means that equations (8) and (9) can be
rewritten as5














Solving the two equations in (10) simultaneously gives us the bride and the groom’s Nash equilibrium
dowry offers. Mathematically, we have









In words, equation (11) tells us two things. First, the equilibrium dowry offers made by the
bride and the groom are centered around the mean of the mediator’s preferred dowry amount (µ).
Second, the difference between these two offers is essentially a function of the bride and the groom’s
uncertainty about the mediator’s preferred dowry amount   Specifically, as   increases (σ2). σ2
(decreases), this difference between the two equilibrium dowry offers also increases (decreases).
The equilibrium described by equations (10) and (11) makes perfect economic sense and it
is also consistent with what we know to be true about real world dowries. To see this clearly, note
that when presenting their dowry offers, the bride and the groom face a very basic tradeoff. A very
low offer by the bride or a very high offer by the groom results in a better reward if this offer is
selected by the mediator. However, a very low or a very high offer also makes it less likely that this
offer will, in fact, be chosen by the mediator. Therefore, when there is a great deal of uncertainty
about the mediator’s preferred dowry amount, i.e., when   is high, the bride and the groom can σ2
afford to make more assertive offers because these more assertive offers are unlikely to be completely
at odds with the mediator’s preferred dowry amount. In contrast, when there is little or no
uncertainty, i.e., when   is equal to or close to zero, neither the bride nor the groom can afford to σ2
make “very assertive” offers because the mediator is more likely to accept the dowry offer that is
close to his preferred mean amount (µ).
We close this section by pointing out that the above kind of analysis—with the normal
distribution—can also be conducted for other distribution functions. For instance, consider the case
in which the mediator’s preferred dowry amount   follows a beta distribution. In this case dm
 and   is the gamma function. When the h(dm)'[Γ(α%β)/{Γ(α)Γ(β)}]d
α&1
m (1&dm)
β&1, α>0, β>0, Γ(@)
parameters   and   are equal to each other,   is symmetric about ½, the mean, and hence the αβ h(dm)
mean equals the median. With some additional clutter, the analysis for this beta distribution case
would proceed exactly as indicated earlier in this section.
3. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed a simple game model of dowry determination. In particular, we first
solved for the Nash equilibrium dowry offers from both the bride and the groom. Then, with the help
of an example, we showed how the equilibrium dowry offers optimally trade off the desire—on the
part of both the bride and the groom—to make an assertive offer with the likelihood that this assertive6
offer will, in fact, be selected by the mediator. 
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions and in what follows, we
suggest two potential extensions. First, it would be useful to extend the static game analysis of this
paper to a dynamic game analysis in which the three players do not interact once and for all but,
instead, interact over several time periods. Second, it would be instructive to examine the case in
which the bride and the groom have heterogeneous beliefs about how the mediator’s preferred dowry
amount   is distributed. Studies that analyze these aspects of the problem will increase our (dm)
understanding of the properties of mediated dowry determination in arranged marriage contexts.7
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